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PILOTS WHO DRINK: FAA REGULATIONS
AND POLICY, AND THE AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION TREATMENT PROGRAM
EARL D. WEED III
A LCOHOLISM has been called the fourth largest health prob-
lem in the United States today.' Pilots are not immune from
the problem of alcoholism,' and drinking and flying have been
shown to be a combination at least as potentially lethal as drink-
ing and driving.' Particularly in the area of commercial passenger-
carrying air service, the results of alcohol-induced miscalculation
or mistake can be disastrous. The purposes of this paper are to
discuss the problem of pilot alcoholism, to examine the methods
of coping with the problem adopted by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
and to explore and compare an alternative early identification and
treatment plan currently being developed by the Air Line Pilots
Association, with the approval and support of the FAA.
I. BACKGROUND: ALCOHOL AND FLYING
A. Alcoholism in the United States
It has been estimated that more than 70% of the adult popula-
tion of the United States indulge, at least occasionally, in the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages.' Further, the number of drinkers
appears to be increasing; each generation contains a larger pro-
portion of drinkers than the past generation.' One study indicated
that 13% of the populace were "moderate" drinkers and 12%
were "heavy" drinkers.' Of this drinking population, a significant
'Gee, Stepping Up Industry's War Against Alcoholism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1977, § 3, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Gee].
2See text accompanying notes 24-35, infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 19-23, infra.
4 J. ROEBUCK & R. KESSLER, THE ETIOLOGY OF ALCOHOLISM 14 (1972) [herein-
after cited as ROEBUCK & KESSLER].
2 See generally id. at 15.
6Moderate drinkers were defined as those who "drink at least once a month,
typically several times, but usually no more than three or four drinks per occa-
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number (one in fifteen or sixteen) become alcoholics, or "prob-
lem" drinkers. Thus, one study indicated, approximately 9%of
the adult population of the United States suffer from drinking
problems.!
B. Alcoholism Among Pilots
Many occupations have risk factors that are conducive to exces-
sive drinking.' Although the evidence does not suggest that the
incidence of alcoholism among pilots is different from that of
other professions, there are certain elements, of a commercial pilot's
job that may contribute to the development of a drinking problem.
It has been suggested that high work load, badly planned or delayed
trips, unproductive time or inadequate layover facilities can com-
bine with intracockpit stresses such as excessive noise, vibrations,
and low humidity, and with physiological factors such as irregular
and improper diet and disturbed body rhythms ("jet lag") to pro-
duce what is known as "pilot fatigue."' As described by one pilot,
commercial flying involves two periods of extremely high tension
levels, takeoff and landing, separated by a long stretch of virtual
inactivity. The combination is very stressful."
In the past, pilot fatigue has been considered a short-term prob-
lem, yet there may be significant long-term effects. 1 Pilots begin
their careers in a better general physical condition than the average
person, yet studies done in the area of pilot incidence of cardio-
vascular disease, for instance, show that as pilots get older, they
become as susceptible to heart disease as the general population.'
sion." Heavy drinkers were those who "drink nearly every day with five or more
per occasion at least once in a while, or about once weekly with usually five
or more per occasion." Id. at 15 (citing D. CALAHAN, C. CALAHAN, I. CALAHAN
& H. CROSSLEY, AMERICAN DRINKING PRACTICES 19 (1969)).
ROEBUCK & KESSLER, supra note 4, at 17.
'R. Masters, E. Hoover, C. Hutchings, R. Gilstrap, G. Chase & J. Pickersgill,
An Occupational Alcoholism Program for Professional Airline Pilots, at 3 (1977)
(unpublished paper delivered at the 1977 Annual Forum National Council on
Alcoholism, San Diego, California, April-May 1977) (citing P. Roman & H.
Trice, The Development of Deviant Drinking Behavior, 20 ARCHIVES OF ENVT'L
HEALTH (1979)) [hereinafter cited as Masters, Hoover & Hutchings].
9Id. at 4.
10 Interview with R.J. De Serrano, Director of Flight Operations, Dresser
Industries, in Dallas, Texas (Dec. 21, 1979).




Thus, occupational stresses probably play some part in the mak-
ing of an alcoholic pilot."3 It should be emphasized that there is
nothing to indicate that pilots are any more susceptible to alco-
holism than are the members of any other profession, yet neither
are they immune.'
C. Effects of Alcohol
The effect of alcohol upon drivers of automobiles is well docu-
mented. Analysis has shown that drivers with blood alcohol levels
higher than .08% stand a substantially greater chance of being in-
volved in an accident than do drivers having no alcohol in their
system." Accident experience has- been found to increase rapidly
as blood alcohol content exceeds .05%." One study indicated
that, for a person with a blood alcohol content of .08%, the risk
of being responsible for a fatal accident was about four times
that of a person who had consumed no alcohol." A 1968 Depart-
ment of Transportation report indicated that drivers with a blood
alcohol content of .10% account for almost half of the single
vehicle crashes in which the drivers are killed."' Thus, there is
no question that alcohol inhibits the skill needed to drive a car.
The adverse effects of alcohol on motor skills, coordination and
reaction time are magnified at higher altitudes." Even a small
amount of alcohol will markedly affect the judgment, neuromus-
cular coordination, attention and reaction time of a pilot.' If there
is an oxygen deficiency such as occurs at higher altitudes, then the
effect of alcohol will be more pronounced if, as some physiologists
1I Id. at 3-4.
'
4 Id. at 3.
0 Waller, Drinking & Highway Safety, in DRINKING 119 (J. Ewing & B.
Rouse eds. 1978) (citing R. Borkenstein, R. Crawther, P. Schumate, W. Ziel and
R. Zylman, The Role of the Drinking Driver in Traffic Accidents (1964) (study
conducted by the Indiana University Department of Police Administration))
[hereinafter cited as Drinking & Highway Safety].
16 Id.
17 Drinking & Highway Safety, supra note 15, at 122.
" Drinking & Highway Safety, supra note 15, at 122-23 (citing U.S. DEP'r
OF TRANSP., THE 1968 ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT (1968)).
9 Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages by Crewmembers Before Operation
of Aircraft, 30 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (1965) (notice of proposed rulemaking)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rulemaking].
0Id.
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believe, alcohol retards oxidation in the cells. 1 According to the
FAA, the physiological effect of alcohol at 10,000 feet is twice
as great as the effect at sea level." Studies have shown that there
is a marked decrease in flying ability at blood alcohol levels of
.04%, which is half the level at which driving is effected, and
less than one-third of the legal driving limit of .15% .'
Aircraft accident investigation in the early 1960's revealed that
alcohol consumption had been a factor in a significant number of
fatal crashes?' In 1964 an alcohol incidence study was done on
158 of the 477 fatal aviation accidents that had occurred in 1963.'
The accidents studied had occurred in the general aviation field,
which included civil, private, business, corporate, and commercial
flying, but excluded all air carrier and military operations." Routine
autopsies done on fatally injured pilots revealed measurable blood
and/or tissue alcohol in 56 cases."' The pilots represented all
classes of airmen and all pilot ratings, with student pilots making
up 19.5% of the total; private pilots, 53.6%; and commercial
pilots, 21.5%."
Other data supported the contention that alcohol significantly
affects flying ability. Of the 39 cases in which it was possible to
determine flight times of the alcohol-positive group, almost 50%
crashed within 18 minutes of takeoff. By way of comparison, in
a corresponding sample of fatal accidents in which alcohol involve-
ment was definitely ruled out, only 26% of the aircraft crashed
21 Id.
22 id.
'Young & DeTrude, Preparation of an Aircraft Accident Case, 22 FED'N INS.
COUNCIL Q. 7, 10-11 (1971).
'Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 19, at 8800.
'Harper & Albers, Alcohol and General Aviation Accidents, 35 AEROSPACE
MED. 462-64 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Harper & Albers].
Id. at 462.
2 7Id. The study did not consider cases in which the alcohol level was less
than 15 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood. In the positive alcohol group,
the average alcohol level was 145 milligrams per 100 milliliters blood. Twenty-
one and four-tenths percent had levels below 50 milliliters and 21.4% had
levels between 50 and 99 milliliters. Id. The commonly accepted legal limit for
driving is 150 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood. Id. at 464.
28 This finding was of particular significance when considering that, in the
total pilot population, only 10% were students. Private and commercial pilots




within 18 minutes of takeoff.' Also, the alcohol-positive group had
a night accident rate almost twice that of the overall general avia-
tion fatal accident group." Fifty-five percent of the alcohol related
accidents involved basic loss of control of the airplane. 2 Thirty-
three percent involved stall-spin accidents, whereas stall-spin acci-
dents accounted for only 13% in the overall general aviation fatal
accident group.' Thus, alcohol would appear to have a decidedly
adverse effect on a pilot's ability to control his airplane.
In a similar study done in 1964, autopsies were performed on
193 pilots in command out of the 436 killed in that year.' Forty
percent of the autopsies showed a measurable alcohol level in the
blood. Of these, 10% had alcohol levels so high as to indicate an
advanced state of drunkenness.'
II. THE FAA REGULATIONS
A. The Rule and its Amendment
The government has long taken a stance against flying while in-
toxicated. The Civil Air Regulations (CAR's) prohibited flying
while intoxicated,' as do the Federal Air Regulations, which
superseded the CAR's.7 Promulgated under the authority of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,"8 the regulations, until recently, pro-
30 Id.
31 Id.
3 Id. at 464.
1 Id. Stall-spin accidents also suggest a loss of control of the aircraft. The
increase in night flying accidents implicate the effect of alcohol on vision. See
generally id. at 463-64.
-'Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 19 at 8800.
5 Id.
'See Part 43, Civil Air Reg., 20 Fed. Reg. 1003 (1963).
37 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 (1979); see Part 91-General Operating and Flight
Rules, 35 Fed. Reg. 17,036, 17,037 (1970). The regulations originally provided
in part that "[n]o person shall act as a crew member . . . [w]hile under the in-
fluence of alcohol [or while] using any drug that affects his faculties in any way
contrary to safety." The regulations were amended in 1970 to also prohibit the
operation of an aircraft "[w]ithin eight hours after the consumption of any
alcoholic beverage." 14 C.F.R. § 91.11(a)(1) (1979). See text accompanying
notes 40-70, infra.
s The Act provides the following:
The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty to pro-
mote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
and revising from time to time:
19801 1093
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vided simply that "In]o person may act as a crew member of a
civil aircraft . . . [w]hile under the influence of alcohol, or . . .
[w]hile using any drug that affects his faculties in any way con-
trary to safety." 9 The agency's experience in seeking compliance
with this regulation and statistics reflecting alcohol involvement
in fatal air accidents led the agency, on June 25, 1965, to file an
advance notice of proposed rule making.' In this notice the Fed-
eral Aviation Administrator noted concern that there was no
specific regulation against crew members' drinking before or during
flight." This concern had been brought about by FAA experiments
showing that complex coordination tasks similar to those required
by a pilot were measurably affected by an alcohol level as low
as .02% .' In addition, the agency noted that the harmful effects
of alcohol continued even after the alcohol had left the blood.'
Even when the severity of the aftereffects did not reach hangover
status, there was a decrease in alertness and thinking ability, a re-
duction in motor skills, and a loss in coordination." The effects
could continue for ten to twelve hours.'
Several potential amendments to the existing rule were proposed.
One suggestion was that a person could be prohibited from acting
as a crew member for some fixed period of time after consumption
of any alcoholic beverage, or at any time the alcohol in his blood
exceeded a certain level.' Another proposal recommended that an
Advisory Circular be issued, providing guidelines to the flying
public on alcohol blood levels which would be present after drink-
ing various kinds of quantities of alcoholic beverages, variations
• . . such reasonable rules and regulations, or minimum standards,
governing other practices, methods, and procedure, as the Adminis-
trator may find necessary to provide adequately for national se-
curity and safety in air commerce.
49 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976).
-, 14 C.F.R. 5 91.11(a) (1979); see Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 19, at
8799-800 (1965).
' Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 19, at 8799-800 (1965).
41 Id. at 8800.
Ild. These tests were performed in a pressure chamber to simulate effects






among individuals and with the passage of time."'
On June 25, 1965, a notice of proposed rule making was issued
in which the agency indicated that it had considered the responses
to the previous notice and had determined that the best course of
action would be to prohibit a person from acting as a crew mem-
ber within a specified time after consumption of alcohol."9 This
proscription would be in addition to the existing prohibition against
flying while intoxicated.'0 The FAA concluded that an eight-hour
limit would be appropriate as a "rock bottom" minimum beyond
which safety would be jeopardized.' The rule would be helpful as
a deterrent for pilots who were not responsible enough to moderate
their drinking habits and would also make it easier to enforce the
FAA policy against flying while under the influence of intoxicants."
On January 16, 1967, more than a year after the second notice
of proposed rule making, the agency announced that it would with-
draw the proposed rule." Although the majority of the comments
received had supported the rule, some major industry spokesmen
opposed the proposed rule on the grounds that it would be un-
enforceable, and that the present rule, in conjunction with the rule
prohibiting reckless or careless flying, ' would deal with the problem
sufficiently.' Other commentators felt that the proposed rule would
undermine extant air carrier policies and practices mandating per-
iods of abstinence longer than eight hours.' Some responses were
also concerned with the difficulties of defining the nature and
quantity of alcoholic beverages to which the proposed rule would
refer."' Others suggested that an educational process would be the
most effective and instructive approach to the problem, and this
4 Id.
4
1Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,170, 14,170-71 (1965).




53Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 Fed. Reg. 675 (1967).
"No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so
as to endanger the life or property of another." 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1979).
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was the plan that the agency determined to follow at that time."
Several steps were taken as part of the educational process. First,
a pocket-sized educational pamphlet was prepared and issued to
all segments of the aviation community. Second, an announcement
was made in the Medical Facts for Pilots section of the Airman's
Information Manual that it would be advisable to allow twenty-four
hours between the last drink and take off time. Last, alcohol was
discussed at pilot safety meetings conducted by the FAA's General
Aviation District Offices on a continuing basis throughout the
United States." In addition to these steps, the FAA continued its
studies of alcohol and flying.' Between 1965-1969, accident data
showed a slight decrease in alcohol-related aircraft accidents." Ac-
cording to the FAA, this resulted from publicity given to the prob-
lem." Despite the slight improvement, the FAA determined that
the situation was virtually unchanged."' When the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, which had previously opposed amendment
to the alcohol rule, petitioned the FAA on January 6, 1970, to
adopt the previously proposed eight-hour rule, the FAA readily
agreed and in response, filed a notice of proposed rule making on
June 11, 1970." The rule was identical to that proposed earlier,"
which prohibited a person from acting as a crew member of an
aircraft within eight hours after consumption of any alcoholic
beverage."
On November 4, 1970, the FAA announced that it would adopt
the proposed rule, and amend Federal Air Regulation (FAR)
91.11 accordingly, effective December 5, 1970.Y7 In response to
comments concerned with problems of enforcement,"' the agency
asserted that the rule would be an additional deterrent, preventing
53Id.
59 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 9217, 9217 (1970).
00Id.
61 Id. at 9218.
62 Id.
63 Id.
" Id. at 9217-18.
"See text accompanying notes 49-53, supra.
"Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 9217, 9218 (1970).
6 Part 91-General Operating and Flight Rules, 35 Fed. Reg. 17,036 (1970).
6 See text accompanying notes 54-56, supra.
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also noted that the eight-hour rule was considered a "rock bottom"
minimum that was not intended to induce the relaxation of stricter




Violation of FAR 91.11 is technically not a crime; no criminal
sanctions are authorized.' Civil penalties, however, are provided
for under section 9012 of the Federal Aviation Act." Any person
who violates any provision of Title VI' of that Act, or any regula-
tion or order issued under that title, is subject to a civil penalty
of not more than $1,000 for each violation.' Since the safety
rules and regulations, including those relating to alcohol and
flying, fall under the aegis of Title VI,"6 violation of 91.11 would
subject the violator to a potential fine of $1,000." The Adminis-
trator may compromise the penalty if the person so charged pre-
sents to the agency mitigating evidence.'
2. Revocation of Certification
The primary goal of the regulatory measures is, of course, to
. Part 91--General Operating and Flight Rules, 35 Fed. Reg. 17,036, 17,036
(1970).
70 Id.
11 Criminal penalties are provided for by the Federal Aviation Act for viola-
tion of certain specified provisions and their accompanying rules and regulations,
but none of these concern flying while intoxicated. 14 C.F.R. § 13.23 (1979);
see 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472, 1523 (1976).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 901, 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976).
- 14 C.F.R. 5 13.15 (1979); see 49 U.S.C. 5 1471 (1976).
74 Violations of Titles III, V, and XII are covered by this penalty provision
as well. 14 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1979).
- 14 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1979); see 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976).
76 See text accompanying note 39, supra.
77 14 C.F.R. § 1315(g) (1979).
71 The person charged with the violation may present . . . any oral
or written material or information in answer to the charges, ex-
plaining, mitigating, or denying the violation, or showing extenuat-
ing circumstances. Materials or information so presented is con-
sidered in making the final determination as to probable liability
for a civil penalty, or the amount for which it will be compromised.
14 C.F.R. § 13.15(b) (1979).
1980] COMMENTS 1097
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keep the drinking pilot on the ground. While pecuniary penalties
for violations may have some deterrent effect, a far more important
penalty is the agency's power to revoke an airman's certificate
under section 609"' of the Federal Aviation Act." Under this sec-
tion, the agency is given the power to reexamine any pilot. If, as
a result of such reexamination, the agency determines that in the
interest of safety, an airman's certificate should be revoked, the
agency may then revoke it." Without a certificate, a pilot cannot
fly.
The power to reexamine and revoke an airman's certificate is
further augmented by the requirement of periodic medical reports
for renewal of medical certification, which is required in addition
to skill certification." FAA medical certificates are valid only for
certain specified periods; for instance, student and private pilots
are issued Class III Medical Certificates, valid for two years,
whereas commercial pilots performing the duties of a pilot in
command in air carrier operations are issued Class I Medical
Certificates, good for only six months." Each pilot must also file
a medical history form, which includes the question, "Have you
ever had or have you now any of the following: . . . excessive
drinking habit?"" There are also questions that further attempt
to discern whether the applicant has alcohol problems, such as
inquiry into any traffic convictions, hospital admissions, or nervous
trouble of any kind.' Since the medical history form is an official
7 8Section 609 provides the following:
The Administrator may, from time to time, re-examine any
civil airmen. If, as a result of any such re-examination, or if, as a
result of any other investigation by the administrator, he determines
that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public
interest requires, the Administrator may issue any order . . .
revoking, in whole or part, any ... airman certificate....
49 U.S.C. S 1429 (1976).
8"See 14 C.F.R. S 13.19 (1979).
81 Id.
"Pakull, Alcoholism and Aviation Medical Certification, ALCOHOLISM:
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, Jan. 1978, at 43-47 [hereinafter cited as
Pakull].
"mId. at 43. Approximately 7500 physicians around the country are desig-






document, falsifying information could subject the signer to a pen-
alty for willfully falsifying or concealing pertinent information."
3. Petitions for Exemption
The regulations provide that there are nine medical conditions
for which a medical certificate must always be denied." If an ap-
plicant shows an established history or clinical diagnosis of alco-
holism,"' one of the nine conditions, at any time in the applicant's
life, a medical certificate is denied." At first blush, this may seem
like an unjust action in the case of a former alcoholic who has
abstained for some significant period. The FAA, however, has
provided that applicants, in certain circumstances, may receive
an exemption from the usual requirements." The applicant must
petition for an exemption and show that there is a reasonable
probability that the condition will not affect air safety and that
the grant of an exemption would be in the public interest. 1
The Federal Air Surgeon periodically convenes a group of medi-
"The regulations provide the following:
(a) No person may make or cause to be made-
(1) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement on any
application for a medical certificate under this part;
(2) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any logbook,
record, or report that is required to be kept, made, or used, to
show compliance with any requirement for any medical certificate
under this part;
(3) Any reproduction, for fraudulent purpose, of any medical
certificate under this party;
(b) The commission by any person of an act prohibited under
paragraph (a) of this section is a basis for suspending or revoking
any airman, ground instructor, or medical certificate or rating
held by that person.
14 C.F.R. § 67.20 (1979).
87 Pakull, supra note 82, at 44; see 14 C.F.R. S 67.13 (1979).
"For the purposes of the regulations, "alcoholism" is defined as "a condition
in which a person's intake of alcohol is great enough to damage his physical
health or personal or social functioning, or when alcohol has become a pre-
requisite to his normal functioning." 14 C.F.R. S 16.13(d)(1)(i)(c) (1979).
" Pakull, supra note 82, at 45. See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13, .15, & .17 (1979).
10 F.A.A., Alcoholism and Airline Flight Crewmembers Policy Letter at 1
(Nov. 10, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Policy Letter]; see also 49 U.S.C. S 1421(c)
(1976), which provides that "[tihe administrator from time to time may grant
exemptions from the requirements of any regulation prescribed under this sub-
chapter [referring to the safety regulations] if he finds that such action would be
in the public interest."
91 Pakull, supra note 82, at 45.
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cal specialists to review petitions for exemption.2 In the process
of reviewing exemption petitions, the Federal Air Surgeon is not
bound by the regulations and may recommend that certain condi-
tions be attached to the exemption, such as periodic medical re-
ports or limitations on the flyer's responsibility." Until recently,
petitions for alcohol exemptions were rarely granted; in fact, be-
tween 1960 and 1971, of the eight petitions submitted, none were
granted." Between 1972 and 1975, there were twenty-one petitions,
of which two-thirds were granted."5 The FAA policy regarding
exemptions changed significantly in 1976 in recognition of the
effectiveness of treatment of alcoholism and in response to steps
taken by the airline industry in implementing identification and
treatment programs." In that year, there were 98 petitions for
exemption from the alcoholism standards; of these, 77 exemptions
were granted."
In determining whether to grant an exemption, a number of
factors are considered. Of primary importance until recently has
been the length of time during which a pilot has abstained from
alcohol." Prior to the 1976 policy change, it was unusual for a
pilot to be granted an exemption where the period of abstinence
was less than a year. On the other hand, petitioners showing
abstinence for over five years were, at least after 1971, rarely
denied exemptions." Other factors taken into consideration are
the severity of the past problem, how long it existed, the number
of times that treatment was sought and relapse occurred, the peti-
tioner's overall psychological condition before and after the prob-
lem, residual medical complications, and the petitioner's continued
commitment to rehabilitation.t" In addition, an unsuccessful peti-
tioner might reapply at a future date, or appeal the decision to
2 Id.
93 Id.
"Policy Letter, supra note 90, at 1.
"Id. Apparently this increase occurred as a part of the gradual shift in
policy. See text accompanying notes 142-152, infra. The Policy Letter is vague
on this point.
"Id.; see text accompanying notes 142-152, infra.
7 Id.
Pakull, supra note 82, at 45; see text accompanying notes 83-94, supra.
"Pakull, supra note 82, at 45.
100 Id.
1100
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)."' On appeal,
the only issue would be whether or not the appellant had a history
or diagnosis of alcoholism." An unfavorable decision following
a hearing can be appealed to the full NTSB and, from there to
federal court."
C. Problems with the Regulatory Scheme
The FAA approach to solving the drinking-while-flying problem
itself has an inherent problem; it does not encourage the pilot with
a drinking problem to seek help. Even if a drinking pilot reveals
that he has a problem only in the course of seeking help, the sanc-
tions are severe, particularly for the pilot who depends upon flying
for his livelihood.'" In the past, management in commercial avia-
tion has simply discharged pilots with drinking problems. " These
factors can lead the drinking pilot to go "underground," that is,
to conceal his problem as long as possible in order to avoid losing
his job and his license.' " Whether or not he is caught, and when,
depend to a certain degree on those with whom he flies. They
must be willing to turn him in, with full knowledge of the oppro-
brium he will face. Several pilots interviewed expressed varying
opinions about the extent to which members of a flight crew
might be inclined to "cover up" for a drunk pilot; in any case,
none of them were able to relate any direct encounter with such
a cover up situation.'7
III. THE PREVENTATIVE APPROACH OF THE AIR LINE
PILOTS ASSOCIATION
A. Problems in Dealing with the Alcoholic Professional Pilot
Whether a pilot with a drinking problem is discovered immedi-




o Id. See also 49 U.S.C. 5 1429, 1486 (1976).
104 Gilstrap & Hoover, The Union as a Catalyst in an Employee Alcoholism
Program, 6 LAB.-MANAGEMENT ALCOHOLISM J. 33, 34-35 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Union].
105 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 1.
10 6 Id.
107 Three conversations, in Dallas, Texas (December, 1979). The pilots in-
terviewed were career pilots with one of the large airlines. They preferred to
remain anonymous.
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ately, or successfully goes "underground," the fact remains that
until very recently there has been very little incentive for a pilot
to bring his problem out into the open. In 1972, the Board of
Directors of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),"' a union
representing approximately 30,000 commercial pilots, met with
their Aeromedical Advisor in a closed session to discuss what
were considered the two major health problems of pilots: cardio-
vascular disease and alcoholism with its attendant complications."
Alcoholism was considered an important problem, not because of
the number of cases, but because of (1) the inherent danger to
flight safety if untreated or driven underground; (2) the FAA's
reluctance (at the time of the meeting) to grant exemptions to
ex-alcoholic pilots; (3) the tendency of management to discharge
pilots with alcohol problems; and (4) the lack of a conceptualized
preventive approach to alcoholism within ALPA."° The Board
decided that steps needed to be taken in order to pull together the
pilots, management and the FAA, to approach the problem in a
non-punitive manner. 1' The union seemed a likely place to start
for two reasons. First, it was apparent that a program for early
identification based on supervisory techniques would not work in
the unique milieu of the professional pilot, as pilots were simply
not subject to much direct supervision."' Second, the FAA's policy
of mandatory denial of medical certificates to alcoholic or formerly
alcoholic pilots constituted a real threat to early identification of a
drinking pilot, and caused fear and mistrust on the part of a pilot
with a problem."' Thus, the ALPA decided that it was essential to
establish a demonstration program that would attempt to resolve
these counterproductive tendencies in the context of a pilot's unique
work environment.'"
108 The union, founded in 1931, represents pilots who work for 35 different
airlines and reside mostly in the United States. The original focus of the union
was primarily on wage issues, but it became more diverse as it grew, with one
of its concerns being safety. ALPA now has an Aeromedical Advisor, Richard
L. Masters, M.D., who was largely responsible for the institution of the pre-
ventive alcoholic program. Union, supra note 104, at 33-35.
109 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 1.
110 Id.
"' Union, supra note 104, at 34.





B. The Human Intervention and Motivation Study
The ALPA, through the efforts of its Aeronautical Committee,
applied for and received a demonstration grant from the Occupa-
tional Programs Branch of the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism (NIAAA) effective October 1, 1974." The primary
goal of the grant was to develop an occupational program model
that would be flexible enough for industry-wide application and
that could deal with the problem of alcohol abuse within the oc-
cupational setting of the commercial pilot."' The project office was,
and still is, located with that of the ALPA Aeromedical Advisor,11'
and was titled the Human Intervention and Motivation Study
(HIMS) .
The ALPA program was not the first industrial program aimed
at treatment and prevention of alcohol abuse."' The NIAAA esti-
mated in 1972 that alcohol abuse problems in the work force of
the United States cost industry over 10 billion dollars per year.'"
A Yale study found that the male alcoholic in industry was likely
to lose an average of 22 days per working year from acute effects
of alcohol, and was responsible for numerous fatal and non-fatal
"
5 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 1-2.
1I Id. at 1; see text accompanying notes 9-14, supra, for a description of
the occupational setting of the professional pilot.
117 Gilstrap, Masters & Hoover, Preventing Alcohol Abuse, AnR LINE PILOTS
MAGAZINE, April 1975, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Preventing Alcohol Abuse].
"1 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 2. For the purposes of the
study, ALPA provided matching funds with the NIAAA on a percentage basis.
Preventing Alcohol Abuse, supra note 117, at 29. E. Paul Hoover was named
Program Director and Dr. Richard L. Masters, the ALPA Aeromedical Advisor,
took on the responsibility for the project as a whole. Additional personnel in-
clude Program Coordinator, Captain Gilbert S. Chase, Counselling Psychologist
Calvin L. Hutchings, Medical Advisor Nester B. Kowalsky, M.D., and Joseph
A. Pickersgill, Administrator. P. Hoover, Review of Human Intervention and
Motivation Study, at 1 (Nov. 1, 1978) (unpublished paper available from the
Air Line Pilots Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as Review].
" See Gee, supra note 1, at 3, col. 4.
20 E. Hoover, C. Hutchings, R. Masters & N. Kowalsky, A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of an Occupational Program for Professional Pilots, at 1 (unpublished
paper available from the Air Line Pilots Ass'n) (citing NATIONAL INsTrrUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH/NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM,
ALCOHOL AND ALCOHOLISM: PROBLEMS, PROGRAMS AND PROGRESS (1972) (avail-
able from the United States Government Printing Office)) [hereinafter referred
to as Cost-Benefit Analysis].
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accidents, both on and off the job.' Also, research indicated that
an alcoholic might suffer from his disease anywhere from 10 to
15 years before it became apparent to his supervisor. ' Many com-
panies concluded that it would be cheaper to have a preventative
program for their workers.' 3 Many firms now employ outside con-
sultants, but some, such as the United States Postal Service, de-
veloped their own in-house services." '
Thus, at the time of its inception in 1974, the Human Interven-
tion and Motivation Study could draw on the experience of indus-
trial programs aimed at the prevention and treatment of alcohol
abuse. The project staff was organized to bring together experi-
ence and expertise not only from other occupational alcohol pro-
grams, but also from the fields of preventative medicine, aerospace
medicine, labor-management relations, and other related disci-
plines."' The ALPA sought out and received the support and co-
operation of the Federal Air Surgeon as well as the management of
a number of airlines.'"M Three airlines agreed to volunteer their as-
sistance in the development of the model program."" The pilots
from the airlines represented approximately 10% of the total
ALPA membership.' 8
Pivotal to the ALPA program is the concept of alcoholism as a
disease, rather than primarily a mental or moral problem."' The
FAA defines alcoholism as "a condition in which a person's intake
of alcohol is great enough to damage his physical health or per-
sonal or social functioning, or when alcohol has become a pre-
requisite to his normal functioning.""' Alcoholism is a unique ill-
ness, however, in that the patient himself plays a large role in his
121 Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 120, at 1 (citing S. BACON, ALCOHOLISM
AND INDUSTRY (1951)).
"I Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 120, at 1.
'. See generally Gee, supra note 1.
"' Gee, supra note 1, at 3, col. 4.
" Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 2.
..6 Preventing Alcohol Abuse, supra note 117, at 29.
127 Id.
"' Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 5. The airlines, though
similar in size, type and location, had differences in labor-management relations,
age distribution of pilots, and medical departments. Id.
"' Preventing Alcohol Abuse, supra note 117, at 29.
1" 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(d)(1)(i)(c) (1979).
1104
recovery. 3' Most importantly, alcohol is a treatable illness."'
For the ALPA program, the goals have been prevention through
promotion of good health, preventing departure from good health,
and preventing disability after the onset of disease." Thus, the
focus of the program has been on education, early diagnosis and
prompt treatment. " Behind this preventative approach is the firm
commitment to the belief that a well-rehabilitated pilot can return
to his profession without compromising flight safety."
C. The "Peer Group" Approach: Human Intervention Committees
Since pilots typically are not subject to much direct supervision
through which developing alcohol-abuse problems could be identi-
fied," the HIMS developed and is continuing to refine a "peer
group" approach, focusing on identification of alcohol problems
and motivation for treatment among the pilots themselves. ' Ele-
ments of the peer group approach include education, intervention,
evaluation and referral, treatment, and follow-up activities. 3 Fol-
lowing a one-day alcoholism workshop attended by the Master
Executive Council Chairman from each of the three participating
airlines, thirty volunteer ALPA members were appointed from each
airline to serve on a Human Intervention Committee (HIC) for
each airline. The committee members were then trained by the
project staff through a course of three two and one-half day semi-
nars and various other task-oriented workshops. These volunteers
were not trained to be alcoholism counselors or diagnosticians,
but were concerned with coordinating educational programs, in-
terventions, follow-ups and program development activities. "
The three Human Intervention Committees have sponsored
direct mailings of alcohol information to the homes of some 3000
pilots. Resource libraries were developed by the committees and
13' Preventing Alcohol Abuse, supra note 117, at 29.
132 Id.
133 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 2.
138 Id. at 3.
1'Id.
131 Id. at 5.
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placed in crew lounges. The committees also organized short
presentations on alcoholism for union meetings. In the meantime,
the HIMS project group has made two attempts to distribute alco-
holism information to all 30,000 members of ALPA and has
also worked through other smaller groups within ALPA for the
purpose of further disseminating information.'
More difficult problems faced the HIMS group in alcohol pre-
vention past the primary, educational phase. Somehow, pilots who
already had alcohol problems had to be made to feel comfortable
enough to come forward with their problems and seek treatment,
rather than go underground. The pilots' fear of losing medical
certification was a serious obstacle.' In 1976, the FAA issued a
policy letter entitled "Alcoholism and Airline Flight Crewmem-
bers" in which the agency noted a change in stance toward
recovered alcoholic pilots who sought recertification.1" The FAA
acknowledged that alcoholism and its complications could be effec-
tively treated in many cases, and supported efforts to identify
and help flight crew members for whom alcohol had become a
problem.1"
As part of the FAA's changing approach, the Federal Air Sur-
geon announced in the policy letter that he would be willing to con-
sider pilots' petitions for exemptions as early as one month after
they had been discharged from a qualified alcohol rehabilitation
facility or similar mode of intensive treatment.1" A petition ordi-
narily would have to be accompanied by a psychiatric evaluation
from a clinician with substantial experience in the area of aviation
psychiatry, as well as a report from the treatment facility.'"
In cases in which petitions for exemption were granted, manda-
tory follow-up reports would be required from at least two sources,
such as a union representative and an air carrier representative." '
140/Id.
141 Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 6.
1 Policy Letter, supra note 90, at 1. See text accompanying notes 143-152,
infra.
143 Policy Letter, supra note 90, at 2.
'" Id. The agency did not elaborate on what it would consider a "qualified"
rehabilitation facility.
"0 Id. Various specific psychological tests were prescribed as part of the
protocol for exemption petitioning procedure. See id. at 3.
I'" d. at 3.
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Other reports, including psychiatric evaluations every six months,
might be necessary, but in cases in which there were long successful
remissions, periodic follow-up reports might be phased out. " ' The
period of successful remission necessary to bring about a phase-out
would generally be two years,'" a considerable change from the
previous FAA policy under which petitioners who could show
periods of abstinence of only a year or less were rarely granted
exemptions.' As before, however, total abstinence would be the
key to continued exemption." * Further, the Federal Air Surgeon
made it clear that this change in policy did not represent an intent
to grant exemptions in any case where an alcoholic had merely
received treatment." Each individual would have to demonstrate
persuasively a commitment to total abstinence."'
Another obstacle the ALPA had to overcome in assuaging a pilot's
fear of the consequences of coming forward with his problem was
the matter of confidentiality. In its application for the grant, ALPA
stressed that only those personnel who had a "need to know" would
be given access to records of the program,"' and no medical in-
formation would be released without the pilot's consent. '" All
information would be handled in accordance with Department of
Health, Education and Welfare regulations and the Federal Privacy
Act." Thus, it was hoped that a pilot would feel free to admit his
illness openly to those individuals who could be of assistance or
otherwise had a need to know, without fear of recriminations.
As part of the peer group orientation of the HIMS, each of the
Human Intervention Committees refers pilots to the HIMS staff
for diagnosis of the nature and extent of any alcohol or alcohol-
related problems."' From there, the staff determines the proper
course of action, which may include further referral to an outside
147 Id. at 2-3.
141 Id. at 2.
' See text accompanying notes 94-97, supra.
Policy Letter, supra note 90, at 4.
1.51 Id.
1"2 Id.
".. Preventing Alcohol Abuse, supra note 117, at 2.
"' Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 7.
"Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976).
"'Review, supra note 118, at 2.
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agency."' If a pilot requires in-patient treatment, post-treatment
activities become the joint responsibility of the HIMS staff and
committee members."' If and when the FAA grants a recovered
pilot an exemption, his out-patient abstinence is jointly monitored
by ALPA, the pilot's company, and the treatment facilities."' The
HIMS staff may also help a pilot prepare his petition for exemp-
tion.'0
D. Results
In May, 1977, a paper was presented by ALPA at the eighth
annual Medical Scientific Session of the National Alcoholic Forum
in San Diego, detailing the results of the Human Intervention and
Motivation Study for the first thirty months."e By that time, each
of the three Human Intervention Committees had made significant
progress in establishing its individual program."' At the very least,
the "peer group" program was functioning, and in two cases there
had been significant interaction with management of the airlines.'"
One airline, it was reported, had been motivated to begin work on
a policy that would be applicable not only to all of its pilots, but
to all of its other employees as well." Thus, management was show-
ing some change in attitude through its increasingly productive in-
volvement."
The educational efforts of the Committees had been successful
in a variety of ways. Informal surveys of participants in Human
Intervention Committees Seminars indicated that almost 75% had
changed their drinking habits following the seminars."' There was
a significant increase in the number of referrals to the HIMS staff
following each seminar."" By the end of 30 months, there had been
250 referrals: 14% were self-referred; 72% had been referred by




161 Gee, supra note 1, at 3, col. 1.
'"Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 7.
6"Id. at 8.
1 Id. at 7.
1' Union, supra note 104, at 37.
I Masters, Hoover & Hutchings, supra note 8, at 8.
167 Id. at 9.
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other pilots; 5% were referred by management or company medi-
cal departments; and the remainder had been referred by friends,
family, and others."8 In 46% of these cases, the HIMS staff only
advised the pilot, but in 54% of the cases, the staff took an active
role in pretreatment evaluation and referral or post-treatment
follow-up." 9
Because of the lengthy nature of the alcoholism treatment pro-
cess, many cases were still unresolved at the time of the 30 month
study. Of those that were resolved, the average time off flight-status
had been 215 days, although most pilots had been able to return
within 105 days."" Others had been off the job for periods ranging
from one to as long as 1,131 days. 1' Seventy-three pilots had been
referred to in-patient programs. while the remainder, if they had
a problem at all, were sent to out-patient or self-help programs, or
had sought treatment on their own.""
The program's most significant results were its success in seeking
pilot recertification and the success rate of the treatment. Of the 74
pilots who applied for recertification under the aegis and with the
endorsement of the program, only one was denied.' Pilots un-
successful in receiving the endorsement of the program were uni-
formly denied recertification. Further, 89% of the pilots en-
dorsed by ALPA maintained sobriety. The remaining 11 % who
relapsed had been taken off flight status and were being further
rehabilitated.' Further study of ways to diminish the relapse rate
was in process with the assistance of the FAA.'
At the same time the 30-month evaluation was done, the ALPA
applied for a two-year extension of the grant. 8 The purpose of
'6sId. at 9-10.








177 Id. at 11. Also, consultants from the University of Colorado School of
Medicine, Department of Preventative Medicine, were reviewing the project in
order to offer criticism and suggestions. Id.
178 Id.
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the extension was to implement the program industry-wide, so that
all pilots could be assured that their problems with alcohol would
be handled in a non-punitive manner that would lead to a success-
ful return to health and work."* In its review of the project, the
NIAAA said the following: "IT]he project has had substantial
effect upon the airline pilots, the airlines themselves, and the Fed-
eral Aviation Authority, which is positive in every respect. Also...
this project could and should serve as the model by which other pro-
fessional associations and organizations could establish and main-
tain an Occupational Alcoholism Program."'" Further noting that
the project had been "highly successful" in identifying, diagnosing
and referring pilots with alcohol problems,"' the NIAAA renewed
the grant."'
The HIMS staff reviewed the project again in November, 1978."'
By that time, the staff had received requests for advice and assist-
ance from approximately 380 pilots.'" About 70% came at the
recommendation of the Human Intervention Committees or other
ALPA representatives."u In 1977, the FAA granted 66 alcoholism
exemptions to commercial pilots, and denied three, one because of
a heart disease complication. '" The other two pilots were partici-
pating in further rehabilitation.""
More important than the continuing individual successes was
the changing attitude of the industry. By the time of the 1978
review, 22 Master Executive Councils of the ALPA had taken ac-
tion toward development of some sort of alcoholism program for
their members, some using the joint labor/management approach'"
Eleven of them had drawn up and distributed joint letters of agree-
ment, and several had requested HIMS assistance with training
seminars.'" Also, by late 1978, some 350 ALPA representatives
179 Id.
" Union, supra note 104, at 38.
181 Id.
182 Gee, supra note 1, at 3, col. 1.
Review, supra note 118.












Interest in alcoholism prevention programs among the airlines
themselves had increased.1"' In 1969 United Airlines had begun
an experimental program which it expanded to cover the whole
airline in 1973." TWA tried some informal programs and, because
of their success, began implementing a national program in late
1977."' American Airlines, when its initial 1972 experimental pro-
grarn had proven unsuccessful, began bringing the program back
to life with the help of an alcoholism counselor.9 '
Other than the obvious benefit to the health of the individual
pilots, a major benefit of an alcoholism prevention program such
as that designed by ALPA is that a great deal of money can be
saved by an airline for a small investment. The HIMS staff did a
cost benefit analysis covering 67 pilots from eight airlines, which
represented all cases referred by these airlines after October 1,
1974, and before June 30, 1978."" Treatment cost, sick leave and
project management services were compared against expected sav-
ings in replacement retraining costs and anticipated savings from
having kept the pilot off of the disability retirement role.'" The
cost return was projected at an average of nine dollars for every
dollar invested had each airline employed a professional staff to
manage these 67 cases."" The study did not consider other factors
such as recruiting cost for new hires and decrease in sick leave
usage following rehabilitation, which might make the investment
return even greater.'"
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS
The ALPA program is a great hope for the professional pilot
with a drinking problem or for one in the process of developing
I" Id.




19 Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 120, at 2.
INId. at 3.
197 Id. at 7.
193 Id.
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such a problem. If this program is fully implemented throughout
the industry, as planned, the alcohol-abusing pilot can feel free to
come forward to find help in dealing with his problem, without
the opprobrium of permanent loss of certification and loss of em-
ployment. A combined program of this sort, utilizing forces in
management, labor and government, should be able to go far,
not only in providing the individual who needs it with help, but
in keeping the drinking pilot out of the air.
The ALPA program will do much for professional pilots, but
it does very little for the private pilot who drinks, or the profes-
sional pilot who, though not alcoholic, combines drinking and
flying from time to time simply out of lack of respect for the
necessity for sobriety, like many of his counterparts, the drinking
drivers. For these problem fliers, there is no doubt that a tighten-
ing of the regulations in the form of the eight-hour rule can make
for stricter enforcement in some situations. Yet there are likely
to be some cases where the rules are broken, and tragedy results.
The private pilot with a drinking problem faces some of the
same problems in coming forward as did the professional pilot
prior to the ALPA program. ' Primarily, he is likely to lose his
certification if his problem is exposed."' Whether this is a deterrent
to that pilot would undoubtedly depend on his individual circum-
stances, and he can always seek an exemption if he is able to meet
the fairly rigorous standards imposed by the FAA."1 Revocation
of certification does not seem unduly harsh either, as it should
serve to keep him out of the air until he is cured. Yet fear of re-
vocation, along with the unavoidable social stigma attached to the
disease of alcoholism, will cause many private pilots to keep their
problems to themselves.
The FAA could take several approaches geared toward keeping
the drinking pilot out of the air. The agency could stiffen the
regulations, as it already has done once, and Congress could make
the penalties much harsher. Sweden for instance, has had some suc-
cess with its system of extremely rigorous standards and correspond-
'" See text accompanying notes 104-114, supra.
200 See text accompanying notes 79-86, supra.
01 See text accompanying notes 87-103 and 144-152, supra.
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ingly tough sanctions aimed at stopping the drinking driver."'
The FAA could go so far as to require breathalizer tests for crew
members prior to operation of an aircraft, although this would,
no doubt, be difficult or impossible to implement, particularly
outside of the commercial context.
A system of rigid rules and harsh penalties, however, would do
nothing to cure the problem where it starts-with the drinker him-
self. As safety in the air is one of the FAA's primary concerns,
it seems only logical that the FAA should take steps toward en-
couraging the pilot with a drinking problem to come forward, and
then to help him find help. Taking the lead from ALPA, the FAA
could set up evaluation and referral services throughout the coun-
try. These units would concern themselves with three areas: educa-
tion of pilots in the area about both the dangers of alcohol in the
cockpit and the availability of the FAA services; evaluation and
referral of those pilots who desire counselling or treatment; and
processing pilots who were successfully rehabilitated by aiding
them in seeking recertification and providing follow-up reports.
Thus, a pilot with a drinking problem would not be deterred from
seeking help because of his fear of losing his certification; he would
know that if he cured his problem, he could be recertified fairly
quickly. The result of such a program would be not only to keep
many drinking pilots out of the air, but to make a meaningful con-
tribution to the alcoholic pilot's private life, by making the course
towards rehabilitation a smoother and easier one to take.
The regulatory scheme thus established should be designed to
make a voluntary request for assistance a more desirable alterna-
tive to enforcement measures taken against the drinking pilot by
the FAA. A strict and severe regulatory approach should be con-
tinued to deal with those pilots with drinking problems who refuse
to seek help, or for those pilots who simply refuse to comply with
the drinking regulations. Otherwise, formal implementation of
.. Drinking & Highway Safety, supra note 15, at 134-35 (citing K. Herrick,
Alcohol and Auto Accidents in Europe, 31 REPORT ON ALCOHOL 3-31 (1973)).
Sweden combines extensive education of its citizens concerning the problem of
alcohol and driving, with harsh penalties, including fines running as high as 10%
of an individual's annual income. Conviction can be obtained with a blood alcohol
count as low as .05%. Sweden reports that only 10% of its traffic fatalities are
alcohol-related.
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an educational and rehabilitation-or-revocation program, modeled
after the ALPA approach, should be adopted by the FAA, par-
ticularly with a view toward saving highly trained; highly skilled
commercial pilots, who would be encouraged to work through
their drinking problems and to resume productive careers.
